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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
~LDON P. ROWLEY~ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
fHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH; THE STATE INSUR-
ANCE FUND; and EDGEMONT 
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10053 
In this brief we are defending the Industrial Com-
mission's decision and order dated September 30, 1963, 
in which the Commission denied Eldon P. Rowley's 
application for workmen's compensation benefits relating 
to his accident of December 9, 1961. 
We agree partly with the statement of facts contained 
in the Brief of Plaintiff; but feel that we should state 
some additional facts to make the case more clear. 
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On May 18, 1962, Eldon P. Rowley filed his appli-
cation with the Industrial Commission, in which he 
stated on Dec. 10, 1961 he had an accidental injury 
in the course of his employment with the Edgemont 
Development Company, which had its Workmen's Com-
pensation insurance in the State Insurance Fund. Dec. 
10, 1961 was a Sunday. Mr. Rowley's later statements 
specified the day of the accident as Saturday, which 
would make it Dec. 9, 1961. 
The first Industrial Commission hearing of this case 
was held on November 13, 1962 by Clarence J. Frost, 
who was acting as the Industrial Commission's referee 
at that time. On Jan. 8, 1963, referee Frost made his 
Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
to the Industrial Commission, ( R. 38) , in which he made 
several errors, among them being one that "the alleged 
injury occurred on a Sunday afternoon." In the latter 
part of his recommendations Mr. Frost said that Mr. 
Rowley's injury was on December 8, 1961. Dec. 8, 1961 
was a Friday. So the referee was wrong in both findings. 
The referee also recommended a finding # 2 : that "the 
in jury resulted from an accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment." 
After the Industrial Commission adopted the recom-
mended findings and conclusions of the referee, in its 
Order dated Jan. 14, 1963, (R. 37), the State Insurance 
Fund filed an Application for Rehearing, ( R. 39), which 
the Industrial Commission granted on Feb. 28, 1963. 
(R. 40) On May 20, 1963, the rehearing of this case 
was held by the Industrial Commission, with the chair-
man of the Commission presiding. (R. 42) Thereafter, 
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on Sept. 30, 1963 the Commission made its final decision 
and order, (R. 60), the third paragraph of which said: 
"The Commission does not disagree with the 
referee's finding that an accident occurred***." 
In the fourth paragraph of this decision, the Com-
mission said : 
"The Commission finds and concludes that the 
accident did not arise out of or in the course of 
applicant's employment." 
In the next to last paragraph, the Commission said: 
"Applicant was not discharging a duty he was 
em played to perform or something in some way 
connected with or incidental to the duty owing 
to his master." 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S ORDER 
OF FEB. 28, 1963, GRANTING THE REHEARING, 
HAD THE EFFECT OF VACATING ALL OF THE 
PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE. 
There have been several decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Utah, which have discussed the legal status of 
an Industrial Commission case following the action of 
the Commission granting a rehearing. In the case of 
Carter vs. Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 520, 290 Pac. 776, the 
Court's opinion went into this subject at considerable 
length, and among other things said, (p. 537): 
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"The effect of granting the rehearing, unless 
otherwise restricted or limited, is to vacate and 
set aside the prior order or judgment of the 
Commission and try the case anew. Whatever 
order is made on such rehearing, it is in effect a 
new order ot judgment, analagous to a judgment 
rendered on a new trial." 
At the rehearing of the case on May 20, 1963, 
(R. 43), we stipulated that the testimony of the witnesses 
who had testified at the former hearing on November 13, 
1962, would be considered as given at the rehearing; but 
we also stated: 
"We are not stipulating to the correctness or 
the truthfulness of anything," 
also 
"We are not waiving any objection that may 
be had to any part of any testimony which might 
be incompetent or immaterial." 
After the rehearing of May 20, 1963, the Industrial 
Commission's record then consisted of the testimony given 
by the witnesses at the hearing of Nov. 13, 1962, and also 
the testimony of Joseph Kirkham which was given at 
the rehearing, ( R. 45 - 48), most of which related to 
the statement which Mr. Rowley had made to Mr. Kirk-
ham on April 9, 1962, which was four months after the 
accident and eight months prior to the first hearing. In 
taking Mr. Rowley's statement, Mr. Kirkham had used 
a Dictaphone, (with the knowledge and consent of Mr. 
Rowley). (R. 47) He quoted 1\tfr. Rowley as saying: 
"We were in the neighborhood because we 
stopped in to see his (my son's) friend. 11y son, 
Robert, had just recently returned from his six-
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months training at Fort Ord. And we consequently, 
in making the visit to his friend, who didn't hap-
pen to be home, we were in the neighborhood 
where Mr. Jensen's home was located, so we went 
by to check and see how the utilities in the house 
were working." 
From the foregoing statement, it appears that the 
main purpose of the trip on that Saturday afternoon, 
was the taking of his son to visit his friend. The other 
matter of calling at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Jensen 
and inquiring about the utilities, was merely an incidental. 
POINT 2 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT 
ELDON P. ROWLEY'S ACCIDENT OF DECEMBER 
9, 1961 AROSE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF 
HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
There have not been many Workmen's Compensation 
cases in the Supreme Court which involved a factual 
situation similar to that ·which is contained in our present 
case, where the "employee' who had the accident was 
substantially his own boss because he owned or controlled 
the company which was the employer, and he could 
choose the times of his work duties as he might see fit. 
In order for the Industrial Commission to perform its 
function and duty of determining the facts, it was re-
quired to evaluate Mr. Rowley's testimony to determine 
whether he started out from his home that Saturday 
afternoon with the purpose in his mind of performing 
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services for the employer, Edgemont Development Com-
pany, or whether the main purpose of the ride which 
he and his son took that afternoon was personal in nature, 
that is for the purpose of visiting together and of taking 
his son to see his friend, and that any services relating 
to the affairs of the Edgemont Development Company 
were merely incidental. 
What may have been Mr. Rowley's purpose and in-
tention when he and his son started out from their home 
that Saturday afternoon, was exclusively within his own 
mind. Neither we nor the Industrial Commission can 
read his mind; so they and we must attempt to determine 
what was in his mind, partly by his actions, and partly 
by what he said about it on the occasions when he did 
make statements about it. 
The testimony of Joseph Kirkham at the Commis-
sion's rehearing of this case, quoted Mr. Rowley's state-
ment of April 9, 1962 relating to his purpose in making 
the automobile trip on that Saturday afternoon, Dec. 9, 
1961. The statement indicated that the main purpose of 
the trip was personal or familial in nature. (R. 47) 
Regardless of what Mr. Rowley's legal status may 
have been during the half-hour period he was in the 
Jensen home discussing how the furnace and the other 
utilities were working, he had finished that mission, ac-
cording to his own testimony. (R. 14 & 21). He left the 
Jensen home and was walking over to where the Edge-
mont Development Company's tractor was located, for 
the purpose of helping his son get the tractor started. 
He was 200 feet away from the Jensen home when he 
stepped off the curb of the public sidewalk and fell. 
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( R. 15) He said that their purpose in procuring the 
tractor was so that his son could help pull Jensen's trailer 
out of the snow in his back yard, so that he could com-
plete moving his furniture from his trailer into his house. 
The ultimate question then comes down to this: Was 
it a function and duty of Mr. Rowley to his employer, to 
take part in procuring said employer's tractor, so that 
his son could use it to pull out of the snow the trailer of 
a former customer to whom a company built home had 
been sold, so that said former customer could more easily 
complete moving his furniture from his trailer into his 
house? 
It had not been contracted or agreed by the Edgemont 
Development Company that the company would move 
the furniture of their customers into the houses which 
customers might buy from said company. The matter 
of getting their furniture moved into their new home 
was the Jensen family's own business. It was not the 
business of the Edgemont Development Company. That 
corporation was in the construction business, not the 
moving business. 
There is strong reasonable basis supporting the In-
dustrial Commission's finding and conclusion that Mr. 
Rowley's accident of Dec. 9, 1961 did not arise out of 
or in the course of his "employment" when he slipped 
in the snow at the side of the curb of the public sidewalk. 
Either his whole detour over to the Jensen home that 
afternoon was nothing but incidental; or if he was in 
the course of his employment when he was in the Jensen 
home discussing their utilities, after he walked away from 
the Jensen home he was "on his own" again. In other 
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words, he had reverted to the same status after leaving the 
Jensen home as he was in before going there. Some ex-
amples of other possible factual situations may be helpful 
in analyzing this case. 
If, on a Saturday afternoon Mr. Rowley and his son 
were going to a grocery store to do the week -end shopping 
for their family, and they happened to see Mrs. Jensen 
(or any other former customer of the Edgemont Develop-
ment Company) coming out of the store with several 
bulky packages, and Mr. Rowley and his son volunteered 
to carry some of the packages to her car, and in doing 
so Mr. Rowley slipped in the snow at the curb of the 
sidewalk and injured his ankle and back; would that 
accident be in the course of his employment as manager 
and salesman of the Edgemont Development Company? 
Obviously the answer is "No." 
Another example of a similar factual situation is as 
follows: If, on a Saturday or Sunday afternoon Mr. 
Rowley and his family are riding in his automobile, and 
he sees at the side of the road Mr. and Mrs. Jensen with 
a' flat tire or some other mechanical difficulty with their 
automobile, (and because of knowing them as former 
customers of his company to whom he had sold a house), 
Mr. Rowley stops and tries to assist them with their 
problem; in doing so he slips in the snow and injures 
himself; would he be conisdered as being in the course 
of his employment with the Edgemont Development 
Company? Again the answer is "No," even though the 
basic factual situation is quite similar to that which is 
involved in our present case. 
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It should be kept in mind that the burden of proof 
is upon the applicant to establish his claim. Grasteit vs 
Ind. Comm., 76 Utah 487, 290 Pac. 764, Wherritt vs Ind. 
Comm., 100 Utah 68, 110 P.2d 374, General Mills, Inc. 
vs Ind. Comm., 101 Utah 214, 120 P.2d 379. This is the 
rule whether the applicant is represented by an attorney 
or whether he acts as his own attorney as Mr. Rowley 
did at both of the hearings. Spencer vs Ind. Comm., 81 
Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618. 
In the case of Kent vs Ind. Comm., 89 Utah 381, 57 
P.2d 724, pages 384 -385 of the Supreme Court's opinion 
contains the following language: 
"\Vhen the Industrial Commission denies com-
pensation and the case is brought to this court 
for review, a different type of search of the record 
is demanded than when the Industrial Commission 
makes an award of compensation and the record 
is likewise brought here for review. 
In the denial of compensation, the record must 
disclose that there is material, substantial, com-
petent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make 
a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter 
of law, that the Industrial Commission arbitrarily 
and capriciously disregarded the evidence or un-
reasonably refused to believe such evidence." 
Smith vs Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 318, 140 P.2d 314, 
is a case which deals particularly with the weight of an 
interested witness' testimony. At page 323 of the Supreme 
Court's opinion is found the following language: 
"The weakness of the plaintiff's case is that 
there is no evidence other than his own testimony 
that he had an accident, or the details or effects 
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thereof, and he is an interested witness. By the 
nature of the accident it is impossible to contradict 
his testimony. Such a situation presents an oppor-
tunity for imposition. * * * Everyone recognizes 
that an interested witness is not entitled to as much 
credibility as one who is not interested." 
At page 327 of the Smith case, the opinion quotes 
from the case of ~'Vorris vs Ind. Comm., 90 Utah 256, 
61 P.2d 413: 
"But in order to reverse the commission*** it 
must appear at least that (a) the evidence is un-
contradicted and (b) there is nothing in the record 
which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontra-
dicted testimony and (c) that the uncontradicted 
evidence is not wholly that of interested witnesses 
* * * and (d) the uncontradicted evidence is such 
as to carry a measure of conviction to the reason-
able mind and sustain the burden of proof, and 
(e) precludes any other explanation or hypothesis 
as being more or equally as reasonable, and (f) 
there is nothing in the record which would indicate 
that the presence of the witnesses gave the com-
mission such an advantage over the court in aid 
to its conclusions that the conclusions should for 
that reason not be disturbed." 
The case of Greer vs Ind. Comm., 74 Utah 379, 279 
Pac. 900, while it does have several points in which its 
factual situation differs from the factual situation of our 
present case, does contain a general statement of law 
which is applicable here: 
"But the mission (for the employer) must be 
the major factor in the journey or movement, and 
not merely incidental thereto; that is to say if 
incidental to the main purpose of going to or from 
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the place of employment, it would not bring such 
person under the protection of the Act. * * * 
There was nothing he was doing for his master 
at the time which exposed him to the perils of 
the street. * * * The accident did not occur while 
he was actually engaged in the performance of a 
duty for the employer." 
POINT 3 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO AWARD COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS TO THE APPLICANT. 
In addition to the statement of Mr. Rowley which 
the witness, Joseph Kirkham quoted in his testimony at 
the rehearing, as we have herein previously referred to, 
Mr. Kirkham also testified relating to Mr. Rowley's 
previous back trouble, ( R. 48) : 
"Mr. Rowley had been telling me the story 
with reference to Mr. Jensen's car, or trailer, being 
stuck in the snow, and that they had gone over to 
get a tractor to pull it out, and he had been telling 
me about being embarrased in not being able to 
help very much because he had been wearing a 
belt, or a brace, and I asked him this question: 
"This brace that you were wearing at the time, 
will you explain what it was, the reason you were 
wearing a brace at the time, and what were you 
wearing this brace for?" Mr. Rowley's answer: 
"I had had back trouble for a period of approxi-
mately two years. In August of 1960 I went to 
Dr. Charles M. Smith, Jr. with my back. I was 
in pain constantly because I was unable to do my 
work. Hardly any movement at all would cause 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
pain in my back, and I "''ent to him and he 
diagnosed it as I recall disc fracture, and he pre-
scribed this brace for me, which I had worn daily 
from the time of the injury." 
The Plaintiff's Brief, (page 8) cited the case of 
Stroud vs Industrial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 270, 272 
Pac. 2d 187. The basic facts of that case are dissimilar 
to the basic facts in our present case. Sergeant Stroud 
had arrived at the police station to check out a special 
car to two policemen, and it was while he was waiting 
there for them to arrive that he received his fatal injury 
by 4is gun accidentally dropping from its holster and 
discharging. In our present case, Mr. Rowley had com-
pleted whatever work might possibly have been within 
his duties as an employee, (manager and salesman) of 
the Edgemont Development Co., namely his checking 
of the utilities, etc. ; and he had left the Jensen home 
and was walking on the public sidewalk 200 feet away, 
when he had his accident by stepping off the curb into 
the snow. (R. 14- 15) 
The cases cited at page 9 of the Plaintiff's Brief are 
not particularly helpful in our present discussion, as an 
examination of each of those cases shows very little 
similarity in the controlling facts to those of Mr. Rowley's 
case. 
In the case of Holland vs Ind. Comm., 5 Utah 2d 105, 
297 P. 2d 230, the Supreme Court's opinion said: 
"***this court cannot say as a matter of law 
that it was unreasonable for the Commission to 
have found as a fact from all the evidence before 
it, that plaintiff's ailment was not caused by an 
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accident and since the Commission's findings are 
binding on this Court unless it can be shown as a 
matter of law that they are so unreasonable as to 
be arbitrary or capricious, this court cannot do 
otherwise than affirm its decision." 
In the case of Lorange us Ind. Comm., 107 Utah 261, 
153 P.2d 272, it said: 
"Unless therefore it can be said, upon the 
whole record, that the commission clearly acted 
arbitrarily or capriciously in making its findings 
and decision, this court is powerless to interfere. 
* * * It was not intended, * -t.· * that this court, 
in matters of evidence, should to any extent sub-
stitute its judgment for the judgment of the com-
mission." 
In its Order and decision of Sept. 30, 1963, ( R. 60), 
the Industrial Commission cited the Supreme Court's 
decision in the case of Sullivan us Ind. Comm., 79 Utah 
317, 10 P.2d 924. Plaintiff's Brief (p. 8) argues that the 
Sullivan case is not in point. Admittedly there are some 
factual differences between the Sullivan case and our 
present case; but the Supreme Court has not changed the 
rule quoted in the latter part of the Commission's Order: 
"To be compensable, it must appear that at 
the time of the in jury he was discharging some of 
the duties he was employed to perform, or that 
he was doing something in some way connected 
with or incidental to the duty owing to the master." 
The argumentation of Mr. Rowley at the first hearing, 
which is quoted in Plaintiff's Brief at pages 6 & 7, is not 
part of the Industrial Commission's record now. After 
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the Commission had granted the rehearing, at the com-
mencement of the rehearing on May 20, 1963, we stipu-
alted that the testimony given by the witnesses at the 
first hearing would be considered as given at the rehear-
ing, ( R. 43 & 44) ; but that stipulation did not include 
the argumentation which Mr. Rowley had made at the 
first hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and order of 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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